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Disarming Fears of Diversity: 
Ethnic Heterogeneity and State Militarization, 1988–2002 
 
We address the question of state militarization under conditions of ethnic and other diversity. 
‘Primordialist’ claims about ancient hatreds, fear, and insecurity in such societies would lead one 
to expect that fractionalization, polarization and ethno-nationalist exclusion would prompt 
governments to militarize heavily. However, contrary to such expectations, we find that higher 
levels of ethnic diversity predict lower levels of militarization, whereas higher polarization and 
ethno-nationalist exclusion trigger neither lower nor higher levels of militarization. If 
fractionalization lowers the hazard of civil war, as many find, then it does not happen via a 
“garrison state” effect. We discuss two potential explanations for our findings, one drawing from 
the empirical conflict literature, the other stemming from economists’ study of public goods 
provision under conditions of diversity. We argue that our findings are best seen as consistent 
with and complementary to the empirical literature on conflict onset and duration.  
2 
The nature of many of the armed conflicts following the end of the Cold War refocused attention 
on the consequences of ethnicity, religion, and other forms of cultural heterogeneity
1 on social 
outcomes (Alesina et al. 2003; Collier 2001a; Ellingsen 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fox 2004; 
Gurr 1993; Harrison and Huntington 2000; Horowitz 1998; Ramet 2004; Reynal-Querol 2002; 
Sambanis 2001; Varshney 2001; Wimmer et al. 2004).
2 The focus on ethnicity and religion 
surely intensified following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, although the tradition of 
explaining Third World violence in the years after World War II as ethno-nationalist rebellion 
under conditions of weak states has deep roots (Drake 1957; Gurr 1970; Huntington 1968). The 
popular wisdom is that ethnic and, if less so, religious conflict are ‘endemic’ and ‘everywhere on 
the rise’.
3 Theories built around the concepts of ethnicity, religion and security dilemmas are 
particularly prominent in the literature (Kaufmann 1996; Petersen 2001; Posen 1993; Snyder and 
Jervis 1999; Walter and Snyder 1999). Ethnic and religious conflict occurs because groups are 
unable to coordinate mutual security fears (Woodward 1995), particularly over questions of 
national integration and exclusionary politics (Cederman and Girardin 2005; Wimmer 1997), 
leading to relative deprivation and spirals of dissent, repression, and outright violence. 
Some theories of ethnic fractionalization and polarization argue that violence may occur 
because of the ways in which state power is distributed that allow some to access state resources 
to greater extents than others (Caselli and Coleman 2006). If a majority hogs state power, then it 
has an incentive to militarize in order to prevent a challenge from other groups. This would lead 
to cycles of repression, causing security dilemmas (Kaufmann 1996; Posen 1993; Snyder and 
Jervis 1999). In fact, the idea of an ethnic security dilemma borrows heavily from the 
international relations literature where states operating in an anarchical international system are 
driven to seek security, but create insecurity among others in so doing. The concept of an ethnic 
security dilemma is applied in the situation where states have collapsed and ethnic groups 
                                                 
1 We use the terms heterogeneity, diversity and fractionalization interchangeably. 
2 It is reported that one English-language scholarly journal database records 249 articles published since 1990 
containing ‘ethnic conflict’ in the title as opposed to just 23 with ‘class conflict’ (Gilley 2004: 1155). 
3 See Kaplan (1994) for a recent explication of the primordialist argument that suggests ethnic and, more broadly, 
cultural conflict to be endemic. Huntington’s (1993, 1996) hypothesis of a Clash of Civilizations provides a related 
argument. Others report that the incidence of ethnic conflict and inter-communal violence is declining (Gurr 2000).  
3 
apparently go from cooperation to violence because of mutual fears about the intentions of 
others. However, the reasons for state collapse and the events that drive the security dilemma are 
artificially separated in this literature (Roe 2000). In any case, it is not just the rhetoric of 
nationalist leadership that ethnic groups and others fear, but also their actions, which are almost 
always explicitly demonstrated by military means. The military is also an important source of 
patronage and power. Powerful groups can use ethnic nepotism to gain from controlling military 
purse strings.
4 Thus, ethnic conflict could very well be one aspect of a cocktail that includes 
ethnicity, corruption, and militarization. 
This paper explores whether ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity leads to militarized 
societies. Specifically, ethnicity and other diversity could lead to security concerns to which 
governments respond with higher militarization. We test this proposition employing several 
measures of fractionalization and polarization on three indicators of state and social 
militarization reflected in military expenditures, the share of military personnel in the labor 
force, and arms imports. Additionally, we also employ a measure of ethno-nationalist exclusion, 
currently only available for a limited group of countries (Cederman and Girardin 2005). 
Our results are easily summarized. We find that ethnic heterogeneity predicts lower rather 
than higher levels of military spending to GDP between 1988 and 2002, controlling for several 
salient factors, such as country size, income, regime type, security risks, armed conflict etc. If 
states fear ethnic heterogeneity, it does not show in terms of how they prepare to deal with it. 
The result is robust to sample size and several different specifications and testing procedures. 
Ethnic heterogeneity is also negatively related to the share of military personnel in the total labor 
force. Since most poor countries are likely to follow more labor-intensive militarization 
strategies, the negative relationship between heterogeneity and the share of military personnel in 
the labor force is also instructive. More ethnically diverse countries are also estimated to have 
lower arms imports to total imports. Religious heterogeneity had no statistically significant effect 
in any of the tests, which confirms existing studies that fail to find an effect of religious 
heterogeneity on either growth or institutional quality. In one set of estimations, it seems to be 
linguistic rather than ethnic heterogeneity that diminishes militarization, but Alesina et al.’s 
                                                 
4 Some report that corruption increases military spending (Gupta, de Melo, and Sharan 2001) and others that ethnicity 
increases corruption (Alesina et al. 2003; La Porta et al. 1998), although no one has analyzed the effects of diversity on 
military spending itself.  
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(2003) linguistic fractionalization measure is highly correlated with ethnic fractionalization as 
measured by others. Furthermore, we fail to find evidence that alternative measures of ethnic and 
religious polarization or ethno-nationalist exclusion lead to state militarization. 
The results taken together do not suggest that governments ‘run scared’ because of ethnic 
and other diversity – quite the opposite. The results do not support those who contend that ethnic 
diversity is predisposed to spur militarization due to security fears. Neither do the results support 
a conjecture that heterogeneous societies remain peaceful because states militarize to prevent 
violent conflict. Realist theories in particular argue that ethnic conflict in Eastern and Central 
Europe was kept in check by Soviet military might, only to erupt with the withdrawal of Soviet 
power (Huntington 1993; Mearsheimer 1990). If in fact diversity is a source of potential violent 
conflict, it does not seem likely that peace prevails purely because of a ‘garrison state’ effect. We 
find exactly the opposite of this expectation regarding state behavior under conditions of ethnic 
and other diversity. 
As possible explanations for our results we draw on and critically discuss two important 
strands of literature. One is the empirical literature on conflict onset and duration, which finds 
that ethnic and religious fractionalization does not predict a higher risk of civil war (Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Mueller 2000). If anything, high diversity makes countries safer, or in other words, 
ethnic dominance (Collier 2001a; Collier and Hoeffler 2004a) or ethnic polarization (Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol 2005) is what matters, not ethnic fractionalization. If rational policy makers 
anticipate that more diverse countries are less prone to conflict, then there is also less reason to 
militarize. The second literature stems from scholars interested in governance and public 
spending who find that heterogeneity leads to lower provision of public goods, such as 
education, health, and infrastructure. Since diversity poses problems for arriving at a consensus 
for co-operative solutions (a question of governance under diverse preferences), the greater the 
diversity the worse the policy outcomes (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Alesina et al. 2003; 
Easterly 2001). If one regards militarization as a means for the provision of the public good 
security, then one could argue that diverse societies encounter the same difficulties of collecting 
taxes, forging political support, or reaching the social consensus required for militarization as 
they do for the provision of other public goods. We discuss these two strands of literature and 
argue why we regard the first one to be the more promising candidate for explaining our 
findings.  
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The next section provides a detailed exposition of our research design. This is followed 
by a presentation of results, which are then subjected to a battery of sensitivity tests. The 
penultimate section discusses two competing potential explanations for our findings before we 
draw out the implications of our findings in the concluding section. 
 
Research Design 
The dependent variables 
We employ a pooled time-series, cross-section (TSCS) data set. Our main dependent variable 
consists of military expenditures over GDP (Military expenditures), which the literature usually 
refers to as the defense burden. We keep this variable in its level form, but our main results are 
hardly affected if it is logged instead. Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) come to the same conclusion 
in their study. The data are taken from (World Bank 2004), which is also the source for the other 
variables unless noted otherwise. They are available annually from 1988 up to 2002, a total of 15 
years. Combining various sources one could in principle construct a panel that reaches further 
back in time. However, given measurement and international and inter-temporal comparability 
problems with military expenditure data, particularly during the period of the Cold War (Brzoska 
1995), we prefer to use one single data source that largely covers only the post-Cold War period. 
This is of course also the period in which so-called ethnic conflict is supposed to be particularly 
prevalent. The recent data are also much more reliable given improved standards for collecting 
data and higher levels of transparency due to democratization and international pressure 
(Omitoogun 2003). The World Bank data originally come from the Stockholm Peace Research 
Institute’s (SIPRI) series of Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security and 
are almost identical to data supplied to us directly by SIPRI (r = .98).  
In addition, we use two other variables capturing different aspects of militarization to 
check the robustness of our results. The second dependent variable is military personnel as a 
share of the total labor force (Military personnel), which has slightly lower data availability 
compared with military expenditures. The advantage of using the share of military personnel in 
addition to military spending is that poor countries may simply use labor-intensive (rather than 
capital-intensive) forms of militarization. Lastly, we use a variable measuring arms imports 
relative to total imports (Arms imports). This variable is only available up to 1999 and in 
principle arms import expenditures should be included in total military expenditures. However,  
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for some countries arms imports are not accounted for in military expenditures (Brzoska 1995) 
and a high arms to total imports ratio provides yet another feature of a highly militarized society. 
These data have their origin in the U.S. Department of State’s World Military Expenditures and 
Arms Transfers reports and are taken from (World Bank 2003).
5 
 
The main explanatory variables 
Our primary independent variable is ethnic heterogeneity, which has received a great deal of 
attention in the recent empirical literature in several fields, particularly in political science, 
sociology, and economics (Alesina et al. 2003; Fearon 2003). As a result, the measures have 
improved tremendously over the measure of ethno-linguistic fractionalization previously 
developed by Soviet social scientists in the 1960s and used in early studies. Defined as the 
probability that two randomly selected individuals from the same country belong to different 







2 1,  w h e r e  pi is the 
population share of ethnic or linguistic group i and n is the number of existing groups. This 
measure of ethno linguistic fractionalization (ELF) mixed ethnic and linguistic characteristics. 
Recently, however, Alesina et al. (2003), Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), Fearon and Laitin 
(2003) and Fearon (2003) independently constructed new measures of ethnic, religious as well 
as, in the case of Alesina et al. (2003), linguistic fractionalization (Ethfrac (Alesina et al.), 
Relfrac (Alesina et al.), Linfrac (Alesina et al.), Ethfrac (Montalvo & R.-Q.), Relfrac (Montalvo 
& R.-Q.), Ethfrac (Fearon & Laitin) and Relfrac (Fearon & Laitin)). They use the same formula, 
but improve upon the older data significantly. These data series are based on more current, 
updated sources, and do not conflate ethnic, religious and linguistic characteristics in a single 
measure as blatantly as the old ELF measure. They also rely on survey-based studies that have 
examined several African countries where distinction of groups is not always straightforward. 
While there are several definitional and operational differences in their methods, Fearon (2003: 
196) claims that his measure is ‘broadly similar’ to Alesina et al’s (2003) measure. Both these 
measures are highly similar to Montalvo and Raynal-Querol’s (2005) measures of 
                                                 
5 There is one data point of more than 100 per cent (Ethiopia 1989), which can happen if there are inconsistencies in the 
reporting and measurement of arms as well as total imports. Dropping this observation from the sample had little 
impact on the results.  
7 
fractionalization (Ethfrac (Montalvo & R.Q.) and Relfrac (Montalvo & R.Q.)). In addition to 
these three sources, Roeder (2001) has developed an ethno linguistic fractionalization index 
(Ethfrac (Roeder)), which is mainly on the original Soviet sources from the 1960s together with 
other Soviet ethnographic studies from the 1980s. 
We primarily rely on Fearon’s (2003) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) widely used 
measures of ethnic and religious fractionalization. We also use the alternative measures to test 
the robustness of our results, a strategy advocated by both Fearon (2003) and Alesina et al. 
(2003). Additionally, Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) argue that it is polarization rather than 
fractionalization that matters. It measures “the normalized distance of a particular distribution of 
ethnic and religious groups from a bimodal distribution” (see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005: 


















1 , where pi is again the population share 
of group i and n is the number of existing groups. Polarization approaches unity when the 
population is made up of two equally sized groups and then declines as the number of groups 
increases further, whereas fractionalization increases monotonically with the number of groups. 
Empirically, across countries ethnic polarization (Ethpol (Montalvo-R.Q.)) is related to ethnic 
fractionalization in a non-linear way: Ethnic polarization first rises with increasing 
fractionalization, but then falls at an intermediate level of fractionalization. Religious 
polarization (Relpol (Montalvo-R.Q.)) is somewhat different; it first increases as fractionalization 
increases and then at higher levels of fractionalization there is no relationship to polarization. See 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) for a detailed discussion. Thus, we also test ethnic and 
religious polarization in our models of militarization.  
Recently, Cederman and Girardin (2005) have criticized conflict scholars for using 
measures of ethnic fractionalization and polarization, arguing that these measures fail to capture 
the essence of ethnic conflict. In their view, what matters are not relative group sizes, but which 
group of which size holds state power and which demographically significant ethnic groups are 
excluded from state power. From this premise, they develop an index of ethno-nationalist 
exclusion (Ethexclusion) with an ethnic group in power in the center, interacting in a star-like 
fashion with each non-governmental ethnic group, but without interaction of the non-
governmental groups with each other. Whereas the fractionalization and polarization indices take 
on the same value whether or not an ethnic majority or minority holds state power, Cederman  
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and Girardin’s index leads to drastically different values for such constellations with larger 
values for smaller ethnic group holding state power at the exclusion of larger ethnic groups from 
state power. The authors find that their index is a statistically significant predictor of civil war 
onset. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, their index is currently only available for Eurasian 
and North African countries. 
Table 1 provides a correlation matrix for the various measures of fractionalization and 
polarization used. There is clearly often strong correlation among the various measures, but they 
are far from identical. We conclude that it is important to test the various available measures if 
we want to ensure robustness of our results. Due to the limited country coverage of Cederman 
and Girardin’s (2005) Ethexclusion measure, it is not included in this table. However, they report 
a bivariate correlation coefficient of .42 and .36 with Ethfrac (Fearon & Laitin) and Ethpol 
(Montalvo-R.Q.), respectively, which are fairly low as one would expect, given its different 
conceptual basis. 
 
The control variables 
Turning to control variables, there is an enormous theoretical and empirical literature that has 
accumulated on the causes and consequences of military spending (Gleditsch et al. 2000; Hartley 
and Hooper 1990). Most of these studies have focused on arms races between the superpowers, 
or are case studies of single countries over time. We rely primarily on two recent empirical 
studies addressing the determinants of military spending (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Goldsmith 
2003), namely Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004b) study of military expenditures in five-year 
averaged periods from 1960-1999 and Goldsmith’s (2003) study of military spending over the 
period 1886 to 1989, none of which addressed ethnic and other diversity, however. 
We control for the level of per capita income in purchasing power parity (GNI p.c.) as 
well as its growth rate (Economic growth), which are commonly used variables (Davoodi et al. 
2001; Goldsmith 2003; Gupta, de Melo, and Sharan 2001). We log GNI p.c. to reduce skewness. 
Most find that income is positively related to higher expenditures, arguing that wealth allows 
governments the greater luxury of stronger defense (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). In economic 
terms, military spending is likely to be a normal good, that is a good with a positive income 
elasticity (Sandler and Hartley 1995). High economic growth rates might make it easier for 
governments to impose a greater defense burden on society. We use total population (logged) to 
control for country size because this influences both ethnic heterogeneity and militarization  
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(Population). Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) report a negative effect of country size as measured 
by population on military budgets, arguing that large countries deter external threats. We control 
for regime type (Polity) using the POLITY IV dataset’s polity2 indicator, which uses a weighting 
scheme to treat periods of transition (www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/). We expect autocracies 
to have higher military spending than democracies (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Goldsmith 2003). 
Many have argued that autocracies are dependent on military force to sustain their rule against 
attempts to overthrow their government, whereas democracies command a greater degree of 
legitimacy and are thus less in need of a strong military (Kimenyi and Mbaku 1995; Maizels and 
Nissanke 1986). We additionally control for overall government spending (Government 
expenditures), since high government consumption generally will have the same causes as high 
military spending. 
Next, we control for internal and external security threats as militarization variables will 
be driven by such factors (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). We enter a term for Civil war, which is a 
dummy variable for years in which a country experiences armed conflict with over 25 battle-
related deaths (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Following Goldsmith (2003), the international war variable 
is a dummy for years in which a country engages in conflict between states with at least 1000 
deaths (International conflict). These data are taken from (Gleditsch et al. 2002). We also 
compute a count of civil and international peace years (Peace years (civil war) and Peace years 
(int. conflict)), or the number of years since the last civil and international war since 1946 in 
order to gauge the proximity of previous conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2002). It is well 
established that, for civil wars at least, there is a high risk of revival even after a civil war has 
formally ended, which suggests that militarization after the end of civil war is likely to diminish 
only slowly over time (Collier and Hoeffler 2004b). Civil wars could also be endogenous to 
militarization. High military expenditures can deter international conflicts, but can also provoke 
them if foreign countries go for preventive action as Kant (1795) already pointed out more than 
200 years ago (Fordham and Walker 2005). High military expenditures can signal to rebels that 
the initiation of a civil war is likely to end in defeat, but particularly in fragile post-conflict 
societies high expenditures can also increase the risk of renewed conflict if the former rebels take 
such expenditures as a signal for the government’s willingness to renege on the peace terms 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2004c). For these reasons, we run tests with and without the civil war 
variables (incidence and peace years) included.  
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Similar to Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) we take a weighted average level of militarization 
of countries that are “contiguous” (Contiguous militarization). The weight is GDP and contiguity 
is defined as either land contiguity or water contiguity up to 400 miles of water. Data are from 
the Correlates of War (COW) project and were taken from Bennett and Stam (Bennet and Stam 
2003). In a context of rivalry, the militarization level of contiguous countries can capture local 
arms race phenomena. In a context of non-rivalry, it can capture emulation, imitation and 
coordination effects. The contiguous militarization variable is not without problems, however. In 
effect, it introduces a spatial lag into the model (Anselin 1988) and often captures variables 
omitted from the model (Simmons and Elkins 2004). We believe our model is relatively 
comprehensive, but it would be difficult to say with confidence that there are no omitted 
variables. For this reason, we run tests with and without the contiguous militarization variables 
included. 
Contrary to Collier and Hoeffler (2004b), we do not include a measure of predicted civil 
war. Such a variable creates all kinds of statistical problems. Instead, we control for the risk of 
civil war directly by our range of explanatory variables, which will capture the risk of civil war 
under the assumption that the factors triggering such war are time-persistent. Finally, we include 
year-specific dummies to capture any trends over time and year-specific international tension 
that influences defense spending globally, such as the end of the Cold War, the Persian Gulf 
War, or NATO action in the Balkans. Table 2 provides summary descriptive variable 
information. 
 
The estimation method 
The estimation of TSCS data presents some special problems, particularly because of complex 
correlation patterns between and across panels (Beck and Katz 1995a; Beck and Katz 1995b). 
Since our data is unbalanced to an extent that no time periods are common to all countries in the 
sample, the standard version of the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSE) method of Beck and 
Katz cannot be used. As an alternative, we therefore use a random-effects estimator with robust 
standard errors, assuming that observations are independent across countries, but not necessarily 
within countries over time, i.e. observations are assumed to be clustered. The robust-cluster 
option produces consistent standard errors even in the presence of serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity, but it is potentially inefficient in estimation (Wiggins 1999). To ensure that 
results are not specific to our estimation technique, we additionally use the Generalized  
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Estimation Equation method (GEE) (Zorn 2001), also under the assumption of clustered 
observations. We would use a fixed-effects estimator were it not for the fact that our main 
variables of interest (ethnic fractionalization, polarization and ethno-nationalist exclusion) are 
time-invariant in our sample. 
 
Results 
Table 3 presents the results for militarization with Fearon (2003) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) 
measures of ethnic and religious heterogeneity. Note that year-specific time dummies are 
included in the estimations, but their coefficients are not reported to save space. Column 1 
reports random-effects results with the robust-cluster option and column 2 results using the GEE 
method.
6 As seen there, ethnic heterogeneity is negatively related to militarization across all 
three measures of militarization and in both testing procedures. Religious heterogeneity is not 
statistically significantly different from zero in any of the estimations. Substantively, holding all 
other variables at their mean values, raising ethnic heterogeneity by one standard deviation 
would reduce the share of military expenditures in GDP by almost three-quarter’s of a percent 
(0.71), which is quite large given that the global average military burden is only 2.9% of GDP. 
What about our control variables? As concerns military expenditures relative to GDP, 
contrary to Goldsmith (2003) who tests a longer time period, we do not find that higher per 
capita income predicts higher defense spending, but a higher economic growth rate allows 
countries to engage in higher military spending. This difference in results might suggest some 
influence from the Cold War period that dominates other tests. Developed and Eastern European 
countries have on average reduced their military spending after the end of the Cold War, whereas 
developing countries have not, or if they have, by smaller degrees. Democracy has a negative 
and statistically significant impact on military spending, thus supporting Goldsmith’s (2003) and 
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004b) findings on democracy’s effect on lower militarization. 
Democratic governments are able, independently of the level of fractionalization, wealth, and 
other controls, to focus a larger share of resources to other priorities than security, a result 
expected by some theorists on regimes and military spending (Russett 1990; Sprout and Sprout 
                                                 
6 Collinearity among the variables does not seem to be a problem. The average Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) score is 
around 2 in column 1.  
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1968). This result is not likely to be driven mainly by the fact that democracies thrive in peaceful 
neighborhoods and autocrats thrive in violent ones, which can be deduced from the fact that we 
control for violent conflict.
7 Larger government consumption is also positively related to higher 
military expenditure. Military spending by contiguous countries and the incidence of civil war all 
have the expected positive sign and are statistically significant, results that are also consistent 
with others’ (Goldsmith 2003; Gupta, de Melo, and Sharan 2001). Military expenditures 
decrease with a longer history of civil peace. Perhaps surprisingly, neither the incidence nor the 
history of international conflict seems to matter for military spending. 
With respect to military personnel as a share of the labor force, neither per capita income 
nor the economic growth rate has a statistically significant impact. Democracy again shows a 
statistically significant negative effect on the share of labor devoted to security. Not surprisingly, 
population size is negatively related to military personnel as a share of the labor force since 
countries with a large population size need to allocate a smaller share of the labor force to 
military duties and still can have a large military in absolute numbers. Higher militarization by 
contiguous neighbors leads to higher militarization within the country. A longer history of civil 
peace leads to lower military personnel, whereas the opposite is true for the incidence of 
international war. The result that the incidence of international war is statistically significant for 
military personnel, but not for military expenditures, may suggest that governments engage in 
international armed conflict in a labor-intensive rather than capital-intensive way using soldiers 
rather than sophisticated and expensive military equipment. 
Lastly, with respect to arms imports as a share of total imports, we find that higher arms 
imports by contiguous neighbors as well as the incidence and history of civil and international 
war have the predicted effect on a country’s arms imports. Democracies import less arms than 
autocracies, but the effect is marginally insignificant in random-effects estimation. Perhaps 
surprisingly, arms imports are lower in countries with a higher per capita income. An explanation 
could be that richer countries are able to produce a larger share of their armaments domestically. 
Government expenditure is positively associated with arms imports, whereas the population size 
and the economic growth rate do not matter. 
                                                 
7 There is a large literature on the democratic peace (Russett and Oneal 2000). For neighborhoods and democracy, see 
(Gleditsch and Ward 2004; O'Loughlin, Ward, and Lofdahl 1998).  
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In tables 4 to 6, we repeat the tests conducted above, but this time using alternative 
measures of heterogeneity. Estimations using Montalvo and Reynal-Querol’s (2005) measures of 
ethnic and religious fractionalization are reported in table 4 and largely mirror the results using 
Fearon’s (2003) and Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) measures: More ethnically fractionalized 
societies have lower military spending and lower arms imports, whereas religious 
fractionalization does not matter. The substantive effect of a standard deviation increase in 
fractionalization reduces the defense burden by almost one-half of a percent. The main difference 
to results in table 3 is that ethnic fractionalization, while being negatively signed, has no 
statistically significant effect on military personnel as a share of the labor force. Results from the 
main estimations reported in table 3 uphold if Roeder’s (2001) ethno linguistic fractionalization 
index is used instead, with results reported in table 5 (note that he has not constructed a religious 
fractionalization measure). Employing Alesina et al.’s (2003) measures of ethnic, linguistic and 
religious fractionalization in table 6 suggests that linguistic fractionalization is negatively and 
statistically significantly related to military expenditures and arms imports, but is not statistically 
significant for military personnel, for which it is religious fractionalization that exerts a negative 
and statistically significant impact. Ethnic fractionalization remains insignificant throughout. We 
re-ran all tests by dropping linguistic fractionalization because it is highly correlated with ethnic 
fractionalization, but the results do not change much. This is not so surprising in that Alesina et 
al.’s (2003) linguistic rather than ethnic fractionalization measure is most highly correlated with 
Fearon and Laitin’s ethnic fractionalization measure (r = 0.88 as opposed to r = 0.76).  
To test this aspect of diversity further, we now test Fearon’s (2003) measure of cultural 
fractionalization that adjusts his measure of ethnic fractionalization for the cultural distance 
between the ethnic groups using linguistic classifications of distance between major language 
families (Cultfrac (Fearon)). For example, if ethnic groups belong to two distinct language 
families, such as Greek and Turkish, then the cultural distance is greater compared to two groups 
speaking Slavic East branch and Slavic West branch. In other words, the greater the overlap of 
shared linguistic traits among ethnic groups, the lower the cultural distance between them and 
the more a country’s index of cultural fractionalization will lie below its index of ethnic 
fractionalization. Indeed, Fearon (2003: 215) argues that “if a researcher’s theory is that ethnic 
fractionalization matters because it makes for diverse preferences and consequent difficulties 
cooperating, then the measure of cultural fractionalization (...) may be more appropriate.” 
Alesina et al (2003) concur. Table 7 repeats the estimations from table 3, but replacing ethnic  
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with cultural fractionalization. Cultural fractionalization is negatively signed, but only 
statistically significantly related to military personnel as a share of the labor force and then only 
in GEE estimation, while being marginally insignificant in columns 1 to 3. Religious 
fractionalization remains insignificant. 
Next, we also tested the hypothesis of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) that it is 
ethnic and religious polarization rather than fractionalization that matters. To do so, we replaced 
the fractionalization with their polarization measures (see table 8). Neither ethnic nor religious 
polarization has any impact on militarization, independent of which dependent variable is used. 
These results do not support the proposition that it is polarization as they have operational zed it 
rather than fractionalization that really matters for predicting militarization. 
Finally, we analyzed the effect of Cederman and Girardin’s (2005) index of ethno-
nationalist exclusion on militarization – see table 9. Their index is never statistically significant. 
However, due to the limited country coverage of this index, one needs to treat this result with 
caution. If and once their measure becomes available for all countries in the world, it will be 
interesting to see whether it produces results that are contrary to the ones reported so far. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
We ran a large number of tests of sensitivity.
8 We dropped the contiguous militarization and 
conflict variables to assess the effects of ethnic heterogeneity without them in the model, since 
these variables might suffer from endogeneity bias. When these variables are dropped, the basic 
results on most of the heterogeneity variables change little, but the heterogeneity variables from 
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2003) and the linguistic fractionalization variable from Alesina et 
al. (2003) become statistically insignificant, while maintaining their negative coefficient sign. 
The government expenditure variable suffers from partial identity bias since current military 
expenditures form part of general government expenditure. Unfortunately, current military 
expenditures cannot be netted out from general government expenditure since the available 
military expenditure data include both capital formation and current expenditures for military 
purposes. If we drop government expenditures from the model, then our results are hardly 
affected. To see whether ethnic and religious heterogeneity exerts a non-linear influence on 
                                                 
8 All results available upon request.  
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military spending, we repeated the estimations with squared and, in separate estimations, even 
cubic heterogeneity terms included. However, we found no evidence for non-linear relationships. 
We followed Goldsmith (2003) and controlled for the previous year’s value of the 
dependent variable. One can argue that military budget decisions are subject to bureaucratic 
inertia (Goldsmith 2003; Gupta, de Melo, and Sharan 2001). Results on our main variables of 
interest are little affected in terms of the sign of the coefficient and statistical significance, even 
though the coefficient size is of course reduced by the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable.
9 
With our ethnic heterogeneity variables being invariant over time, we cannot compute a fixed 
effects model. However, we tried to capture some crude cross-regional heterogeneity by regional 
dummy variables, where the regional classification follows that of the World Bank (2004). With 
the exception of the region of North Africa and Middle East, which often showed a higher level 
of militarization, there was little evidence for systematic regional differences. Our main results 
were hardly affected with the exception of the heterogeneity variables derived from Montalvo 
and Reynal-Querol (2003) and Alesina et al. (2003), which sometimes became (marginally) 
insignificant, while maintaining their negative coefficient sign. In these estimations, the average 
weighted militarization of contiguous countries often became statistically significant as well. 
This is not surprising given that militarization of contiguous countries is correlated with regional 
levels of militarization.  
Next, we limited our analyses to a sub-sample of only developing countries. The results 
on diversity remain very similar. The share of the population urbanized had little effect on the 
results when added to the models, nor was this variable statistically significant, contrary to the 
findings of others (Davoodi et al. 2001). The same is true for the level of aid to gross national 
income, which might ease the governmental budget constraint. One might wonder whether oil 
wealth might allow governments to achieve greater levels of militarization. Adding a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if oil exports reach one third of total GDP (Fearon and Laitin 
2003), suggests no impact on military expenditures or military personnel, but oil has a positive 
and statistically significant effect on arms imports. This concurs with the fact that major oil 
exporters, such as the Gulf countries, have been major arms importers over the last decade or so. 
The results on the remaining variables were hardly affected, however. The same is true if we add 
a dummy variable for the 20 largest arms-producing countries based on information from SIPRI 
                                                 
9 A lagged dependent variable can potentially mask any causal effects by the other explanatory variables (Achen 2000).  
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to the arms imports regressions (SIPRI 2002). Major arms producers import fewer arms, as one 
would expect given they can satisfy parts of their arms demand by domestic production, but our 
main results remain valid.  
In sum, there is no indication from any of the tests that fractionalization increases 
militarization. The same is true for polarization. These results disconfirm what we would expect 
to see from theoretical arguments about ethnic and other diversity, security dilemmas, fear, and 
militarization. 
 
In Search of Explanation: Why Are Diverse Societies Less Militarized? 
What might explain that contrary to what one might expect given the rhetoric of ethnic and 
religious conflict and the supposed ensuing security dilemmas, diverse societies do not respond 
with higher levels of militarization? Why do governments in such societies not react in a way 
that many would regard as a rational response to real and/or perceived threats emanating from 
ethnic and other diversity? 
Two strands of literature are relevant for providing potential explanations. The first 
comes from the empirical literature on conflict onset. Recent studies of civil war show that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, ethnic diversity’s role in conflict is not straightforward. 
Ethnicity is important of course for organization and mobilization of support, but conflict occurs 
when the opportunity for using violence is maximized. Some studies have shown a curvilinear 
association between ethnic fractionalization and conflict. Highly homogeneous and highly 
heterogeneous societies are both able to maintain peace. In highly homogeneous societies there is 
little ethnic strife, whereas a high degree of fractionalization prevents mobilization on issues. 
Collier (2001) argues that highly fractionalized societies will pose difficulties for large enough 
minimum winning coalitions to form so that groups will not be able to challenge a state’s 
monopoly on force effectively. The trouble is in between, with moderately fractionalized 
societies facing the greatest danger (Collier and Hoeffler 2004a; de Soysa 2002). Others call this 
polarization, where two equally sized groups are the most dangerous, or in other words, where 
moderate fractionalization prevails, since measures of polarization are at a maximum when 
society is made up of two groups containing 50% of the population each (Alesina et al. 2003; 
Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2002). Moreover, if the largest minority is large enough, it 
is a more attractive target for expropriation by a majority, thus leading to polarized conflict and  
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violence (Caselli and Coleman 2006). Cederman and Girardin (2005) provide evidence that 
higher levels ethno-nationalist exclusion increases the risk of civil war, but due to the limited 
country coverage of their measure it is as yet unclear whether the effect holds for a global sample 
as well. 
The second strand of literature stems from predominantly economists who have found that 
diversity negatively affects economic development and other public policy outcomes because 
diversity makes consensus difficult. Ethnic heterogeneity (and polarization) is seen as the 
underlying cause of the failure of collective action, particularly as it generates incentives for 
rent-seeking (Alesina 1994; Alesina and Drazen 1991; Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Garcia-
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005). Political economy models suggest that heterogeneity is 
“prone to competitive rent-seeking by the different groups that have difficulty agreeing on public 
goods like infrastructure, education, and good policies” (Easterly and Levine 1997: 2). This 
phenomenon has been demonstrated at various levels of aggregation – see, for example, Alesina, 
Baqir and Easterly’s (1999) study of the negative impact of ethnic fractionalization on public 
good spending in U.S. cities and Easterly and Levine’s (1997) cross-national study explaining a 
good part of Africa’s growth tragedy with the negative effects of its high degree of ethno-
linguistic fractionalization on political stability, the provision of public goods and growth-
promoting policies.
10 Apparently, the diverse preferences of heterogeneous groups make it more 
difficult to forge public policies that benefit the collectivity. In the US city example, it is noted 
that white Americans prefer low taxes in cities with heterogeneous populations because of the 
belief that blacks benefit predominantly from spending on public goods. Africa’s economic woes 
are directly related to the bad public policy decisions made as a result of ethnic heterogeneity, 
where political conflict impedes public good provision such as education and health (Easterly 
and Levine 1997).  
Other cross-national studies show that ethnic polarization lowers investment, whereas 
religious polarization increases government consumption relative to GDP (Garcia-Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol 2005). However, Alesina et al (2003) find that it is diversity that matters more 
than polarization on the question of poor economic policy and public goods provision. Possibly, 
the negative effects of fractionalization are mitigated in democracies (Collier 2000; 2001) or 
                                                 
10 Posner (2004) corrects Easterly and Levine’s (1997) measure for ethnic groups that are politically relevant and 
comes to the same conclusion.  
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rather, as Easterly (2001) argues, where institutional quality is high, which is only weakly 
correlated with democracy. However, institutional quality is itself negatively affected by ethnic 
fractionalization (Alesina et al. 2003; Keefer and Knack 2002). 
Several scholars treat military spending as a public good both regionally and within 
countries because if in fact it buys security, then others benefit from having to spend less given 
the regional nature of the consequences (Olson 1982). If this is correct, then military spending 
and militarization more generally would be subject to the similar detrimental consequences of 
diversity as other forms of public goods provision, which would be consistent with the results 
presented above. 
Starting with the second potential explanation, we believe that whilst the results are 
consistent with the predictions of this literature, the negative effect of diversity on public goods 
provision is unlikely to be the causal mechanism at work. This is because in our view it is highly 
questionable whether militarization represents a public good. Security is a public good, but 
militarization might not provide it. Collier and Hoeffler (2004b) do not find that higher military 
spending deters civil conflict, whilst Collier and Hoeffler (2004c) even show that higher 
spending might increase rather than reduce the risk of renewed conflict in fragile post-conflict 
societies. Kant (1795) and other liberals believe that military expenditures and other forms of 
militarization are likely to be excessive and indeed often dangerous as they spur rather than deter 
conflict and lower rather than increase security. Since democracy typically promotes public 
goods provision (Baum and Lake 2003; Boix 2001; Lake and Baum 2001), the interpretation of 
militarization as a form of public goods provision does not sit well since democracy lowers 
rather than increases militarization. 
What about the other potential explanation? If policy makers can anticipate that ethnically 
and otherwise diverse societies are less rather than more prone to conflict, then there is less need 
to militarize in such societies and our estimated results make sense. That diversity can lead to 
peaceful conditions, in which high levels of militarization are not necessary, finds also support in 
some theoretical contributions. For example, Fearon and Laitin (1996) developed theories of 
interethnic cooperation built on in-group policing and fear of spirals of conflict, which might 
provide an explanation for the fact that highly fractionalized societies are surprisingly peaceful. 
Our estimations of government behavior in the military sector under conditions of diversity 
supports those views that suggest ways in which diversity may in fact constrain violence (Collier 
2001b; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Varshney 2001).  
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Interestingly, the empirical literature suggests that while diverse societies tend to be more 
peaceful, situations of ethnic polarization and ethno-nationalist exclusion can indeed spur violent 
conflict. This is tentatively consistent with our findings since it is exactly for measures of ethnic 
polarization and ethno-nationalist exclusion for which we find no statistically significantly 
negative effect. Diverse societies are less militarized, but polarized societies are not. Neither are 
societies with strong levels of ethno-nationalist exclusion, but due to the limited country 
coverage of this measure, this finding needs to be treated as preliminary for the moment.  
 
Conclusions 
Explanations of violent conflict often see ethnic diversity as problematic because it can lead to 
mutual hatred and fear stemming from historic legacies, and may lead to security dilemmas and 
domination and control by majority-controlled states of minority groups and vice versa. The 
question our study was concerned with is: if the pessimistic theories of ethnic diversity and 
ethnic conflict are true, then do states respond first and foremost with militarization to address 
security considerations believing that higher militarization leads to greater security? Our results 
simply do not support this view. Militarization is actually lower under conditions of greater 
diversity measured by several different indicators. 
Clearly, wider coverage of militarization variables beyond spending, the size of military 
forces and arms imports will provide more opportunities of testing the effects of ethnic and other 
diversity on states’ response to real and perceived threats. Perhaps empirical studies in the future 
could include those expenditures classified as internal security expenditures on police and 
paramilitary forces, both public and private. Future research should also go beyond an aggregate 
measure of ethnic diversity and distinguish among ethnic minorities according to their degree of 
political activism and the extent to which grievances are expressed, their long-term political 
objective (equality of rights, autonomy, separatism and others) and the history of past violent 
clashes among ethnic groups in a country. One might be able to address some of these issues 
using data from the Minorities at Risk dataset, a task, which the current authors would like to 
take on in the future. Use of the dataset is not without problems, however, since the project only 
recognizes ethnic groups when some level of political conflict or repression exists. Since we are 
interested in how ethnic diversity relates to state militarization generally, not just in cases where  
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conflict or repression exists, we used general measures of ethnic diversity and polarization, as 
otherwise our results might suffer from selection bias. 
Our analyses suggest clearly that ethnic diversity promotes lower militarization. Two 
potential explanations were discussed for this result. One draws from research predominantly 
undertaken by economists demonstrating how public goods provision is systematically lower in 
more diverse societies. We argued against this interpretation of our results, stating that while 
security is a public good, militarization might not provide it. Also, if militarization were a public 
good then we would observe a positive effect of democracy on militarization since democracy is 
known to be a strong determinant of public goods provision. However, our results suggest the 
opposite. We therefore favor the second explanation, which draws from the empirical literature 
on conflict onset and duration. This literature demonstrates that contrary to conventional 
wisdom, more diverse societies are not more prone to conflict and indeed perhaps are even more 
peaceful. If so and policy makers anticipate this, then they might see less need for militarization 
in diverse societies. The empirical conflict literature also suggests that ethnically and religiously 
polarized countries and those characterized by ethno-nationalist exclusion might face a higher 
risk of armed conflict. Interestingly, it is for the measures of polarization and ethno-nationalist 
exclusion that we fail to find the statistically significant negative effect on militarization. In 
conclusion, we believe that our results are consistent with and complementary to the empirical 
literature on conflict that suggests that fears about social diversity as security threats are largely 
unfounded.   
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Table 1. Correlation matrix of fractionalization and polarization measures. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9 9  10 
1:  Ethfrac  (Fearon  &  Laitin)  1.00           
2:  Relfrac  (Fearon  &  Laitin)  0.39  1.00          
3:  Cultfrac  (Fearon)  0.82  0.33  1.00         
4:  Ethfrac  (Alesina  et  al.)  0.76  0.31  0.74  1.00        
5: Relfrac (Alesina et al.)  0.31  0.89  0.20  0.23  1.00           
6:  Linfrac  (Alesina  et  al.)  0.88 0.40 0.74 0.68 0.31 1.00         
7:  Ethlinfrac  (Roeder)  0.85 0.43 0.70 0.83 0.36 0.76 1.00       
8:  Ethfrac  (Montalvo  &  Reynal-Querol)  0.84 0.36 0.68 0.81 0.29 0.73 0.86 1.00     
9:  Relfrac  (Montalvo  &  Reynal-Querol)  0.51 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.52 0.54 1.00   
10:  Ethpol  (Montalvo  &  Reynal-Querol)  0.42 0.12 0.39 0.55 0.11 0.28 0.51 0.58 0.32 1.00 
11:  Relpol  (Montalvo  &  Reynal-Querol)  0.54 0.46 0.51 0.59 0.47 0.50 0.58 0.57 0.96 0.40 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
Military expenditures per GDP  1589  2.90  2.82  0  29.00 
Military personnel per labor force  1393  1.39  1.72  0  23.68 
Arms imports to total imports  1406  2.85  5.32  0  36.86 
Ethfrac (Fearon & Laitin)  1587  0.40  0.27  0  0.93 
Relfrac (Fearon & Laitin)  1587  0.36  0.21  0  0.78 
Cultfrac (Fearon)  1561  0.30  0.20  0  0.73 
Ethfrac (Alesina et al.)  1589  0.44  0.25  0  0.93 
Relfrac (Alesina et al.)  1589  0.42  0.23  0  0.86 
Linfrac (Alesina et al.)  1560  0.39  0.28  0  0.92 
Ethlinfrac (Roeder)  1589  0.46  0.27  0  0.98 
Ethfrac  (Montalvo  &  Reynal-Querol)  1307 0.44 0.28 0.01 0.96 
Relfrac  (Montalvo  &  Reynal-Querol)  1321 0.28 0.23 0.00 0.78 
Ethpol (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol)  1307  0.51  0.24  0.02  0.98 
Relpol (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol)  1321  0.46  0.34  0  1.00 
Ethexclusion (Cederman & Girardin)  876  0.05  0.15  0  0.99 
GNI  p.c.  (ln)  1589 8.34 1.15 5.94  10.49 
Economic growth  1589  0.04  0.06  -0.51  0.33 
Polity 1589  2.92  6.97  -10.00  10.00 
Government expenditures  1589  16.24  6.64  2.98  56.51 
Population (ln)  1589  16.30  1.46  12.87  20.97 
Contiguous military expenditures  1589  2.97  2.28  0  24.46 
Contiguous military personnel  1393  1.21  1.14  0  9.43 
Contiguous arms imports  1406  2.85  5.32  0  36.86 
Peace years (civil war)  1589 20.14 18.95 0 56.00 
Peace years (international conflict) 1589 26.77 17.31 0.00 56.00 
Civil  war  1589 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
International  conflict  1589 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 
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Table 3. Militarization and Fearon and Laitin’s measures of fractionalization, 1988–2002 
 













Ethfrac (Fearon & Laitin)  -2.523***  -2.545***  -0.903** -0.940** -3.307** -3.311** 
  (4.15) (4.15) (2.46) (2.46) (2.41) (2.46) 
Relfrac (Fearon & Laitin)  0.877  0.880  -0.541  -0.559  0.611  0.647 
  (1.20) (1.21) (1.31) (1.34) (0.40) (0.43) 
GNI p.c. (ln)  -0.328  -0.338  0.050  0.035  -0.690*  -0.647* 
  (1.39) (1.43) (0.46) (0.31) (1.93) (1.86) 
Economic growth  1.293**  1.281**  0.093  0.064  -0.208  -0.097 
  (2.08) (2.09) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.04) 
Polity  -0.040**  -0.039**  -0.012*  -0.012* -0.105 -0.112* 
  (2.28) (2.25) (1.89) (1.79) (1.62) (1.72) 
Government  expenditures  0.158***  0.157***  0.028** 0.028** 0.161**  0.164*** 
  (4.52) (4.56) (2.17) (2.15) (2.52) (2.69) 
Population (ln)  -0.034  -0.044  -0.150**  -0.164**  0.375  0.390 
  (0.30) (0.38) (2.35) (2.30) (1.49) (1.57) 
Contiguous  militarization  0.130** 0.126** 0.568** 0.557**  0.110  0.118* 
  (2.52) (2.48) (2.23) (2.17) (1.55) (1.72) 
Peace years (civil war)  -0.020***  -0.020*** -0.004*  -0.004** -0.024*  -0.024* 
  (3.74) (3.74) (1.81) (2.02) (1.84) (1.89) 
Peace years (intern. conflict) 0.006  0.007  -0.009 -0.009  -0.035** -0.031** 
  (0.72) (0.74) (1.56) (1.53) (2.30) (2.20) 
Civil war  0.639***  0.639***  0.055  0.053  2.375**  2.391*** 
  (3.24) (3.26) (0.77) (0.76) (2.55) (2.60) 
International conflict  0.763  0.761  0.608*  0.612*  3.232**  3.160** 
  (1.24) (1.25) (1.79) (1.80) (2.19) (2.18) 
Observations  1587 1587 1383 1383 1396 1396 
Countries  131 131 138 138 139 139 
 
Notes: Absolute t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, 
but coefficients not reported. *, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively.  
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Table 4. Militarization and Montalvo and Reynal-Queirol’s measures of fractionalization, 1988–
2002 
 









Arms Imports  Arms Imports 
Ethfrac (Montalvo 
& R-Q.) 
-1.580** -1.688**  -0.771 -0.777 -2.985*  -2.979* 
  (2.02) (2.03) (1.22) (1.21) (1.68) (1.68) 
Relfrac (Montalvo 
& R-Q.) 
1.173 1.002 0.786 0.769 0.670 0.684 
  (1.40) (1.11) (1.37) (1.35) (0.37) (0.38) 
GNI p.c. (ln)  0.062  -0.026  0.218*  0.213*  -0.406  -0.407 
  (0.25) (0.08) (1.76) (1.69) (1.09) (1.10) 
Economic growth  0.848  0.855  -0.967  -0.968  -4.458  -4.354 
  (1.21) (1.22) (0.86) (0.87) (1.14) (1.12) 
Polity -0.036**  -0.032*  -0.005  -0.005  -0.160**  -0.160** 
  (1.98) (1.80) (0.76) (0.74) (2.09) (2.12) 
Government 
expenditures 
0.135*** 0.128*** 0.016**  0.016**  0.208*** 0.205*** 
  (5.01) (4.84) (2.01) (2.00) (2.60) (2.58) 
Population (ln)  -0.121  -0.204  -0.223**  -0.231**  0.370  0.361 
  (0.84) (1.21) (2.49) (2.49) (1.31) (1.28) 
Contiguous 
militarization 
0.104** 0.090* 0.579**  0.574**  0.115  0.113 
  (1.99) (1.80) (2.13) (2.12) (1.37) (1.35) 
Peace years (civil 
war) 
-0.023*** -0.023*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.039** -0.039*** 
  (4.07) (3.95) (2.94) (2.97) (2.56) (2.60) 
Peace years (intern. 
conflict) 
0.010 0.011  -0.007  -0.007  -0.036**  -0.036** 
  (1.19) (1.36) (1.23) (1.21) (2.33) (2.36) 
Civil war  0.598***  0.603***  0.068  0.068  2.185**  2.191** 
  (2.92) (2.96) (0.93) (0.94) (2.16) (2.18) 
International 
conflict 
0.254 0.233  0.300*  0.298*  1.886**  1.903** 
  (0.87) (0.81) (1.76) (1.76) (2.16) (2.21) 
Observations  1307 1307 1161 1161 1164 1164 
Countries 102  102  109  109  109  109 
 
Notes: Absolute t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, 




Table 5. Militarization and Roeder’s measure of fractionalization, 1988–2002 













Ethlinfrac (Roeder)  -1.612**  -1.634** -0.940**  -0.978**  -2.300* -2.306* 
  (2.20)  (2.21)  (2.05) (2.05) (1.71) (1.78) 
GNI p.c. (ln)  -0.241  -0.252  0.086  0.074  -0.541  -0.509 
  (0.98)  (1.02)  (0.87) (0.72) (1.35) (1.28) 
Economic growth  1.282**  1.271**  0.137  0.112  -0.457  -0.379 
  (2.07)  (2.07)  (0.22) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) 
Polity -0.038**  -0.037**  -0.012*  -0.011*  -0.097  -0.102 
  (2.18)  (2.16)  (1.83) (1.74) (1.51) (1.58) 
Government  expenditures  0.158***  0.157*** 0.025** 0.025** 0.150**  0.153*** 
  (4.51)  (4.55)  (2.06) (2.03) (2.46) (2.61) 
Population (ln)  -0.024  -0.033  -0.140**  -0.154**  0.367  0.383 
  (0.21)  (0.29)  (2.18) (2.13) (1.52) (1.61) 
Contiguous militarization  0.130**  0.126**  0.574**  0.562**  0.120  0.129* 
  (2.54)  (2.50)  (2.22) (2.15) (1.63) (1.81) 
Peace years (civil war)  -0.020***  -0.020*** -0.004* -0.004** -0.022*  -0.022* 
  (3.60)  (3.60)  (1.75) (2.00) (1.72) (1.74) 
Peace years (intern. conflict) 0.007  0.007  -0.009 -0.009  -0.034** -0.030** 
  (0.74)  (0.75)  (1.50) (1.48) (2.26) (2.17) 
Civil war  0.642***  0.642***  0.062  0.060  2.389**  2.403*** 
  (3.24)  (3.27)  (0.88) (0.87) (2.57) (2.62) 
International conflict  0.753  0.753  0.607*  0.612*  3.249**  3.176** 
  (1.23)  (1.24)  (1.76) (1.77) (2.17) (2.16) 
Observations  1589  1589  1393 1393 1406 1406 
Countries  132  132  139 139 140 140 
 
Notes: Absolute t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, 




Table 6. Militarization and Alesina et al.’s measures of fractionalization, 1988–2002 
 












Ethfrac (Alesina et al.)  0.517  0.486  0.901  0.867  1.590  1.470 
 (0.51)  (0.48)  (1.12)  (1.06)  (1.01)  (0.95) 
Relfrac (Alesina et al.)  -0.321  -0.314  -0.794*  -0.801*  -0.498  -0.428 
 (0.47)  (0.46)  (1.88)  (1.89)  (0.34)  (0.30) 
Linfrac (Alesina et al.)  -1.464*  -1.473*  -0.943  -0.961  -2.688*  -2.698** 
 (1.77)  (1.78)  (1.53)  (1.57)  (1.96)  (1.99) 
GNI p.c. (ln)  -0.187  -0.203  0.155  0.140  -0.437  -0.414 
 (0.73)  (0.78)  (1.40)  (1.24)  (1.13)  (1.11) 
Economic growth  1.197*  1.182*  0.028  0.006  0.330  0.414 
 (1.83)  (1.83)  (0.04)  (0.01)  (0.14)  (0.18) 
Polity -0.037**  -0.037**  -0.012*  -0.011*  -0.108  -0.115* 
 (2.15)  (2.11)  (1.77)  (1.69)  (1.63)  (1.72) 
Government 
expenditures 
0.159*** 0.158*** 0.025** 0.025** 0.154**  0.157*** 
 (4.50)  (4.54)  (2.11)  (2.08)  (2.49)  (2.65) 
Population (ln)  -0.022  -0.033  -0.129**  -0.141**  0.393  0.405* 
 (0.19)  (0.28)  (2.08)  (2.05)  (1.63)  (1.70) 
Contiguous 
militarization 
0.129** 0.124**  0.569**  0.558**  0.114  0.123* 
 (2.49)  (2.44)  (2.24)  (2.17)  (1.51)  (1.69) 
Peace years (civil war)  -0.018***  -0.018*** -0.003  -0.004*  -0.016  -0.016 
 (3.33)  (3.32)  (1.51)  (1.71)  (1.16)  (1.21) 
Peace years (intern. 
conflict) 
0.006 0.006  -0.009  -0.009  -0.039**  -0.035** 
 (0.64)  (0.67)  (1.51)  (1.49)  (2.47)  (2.40) 
Civil war  0.629***  0.629***  0.034  0.032  2.482**  2.501** 
 (2.95)  (2.98)  (0.51)  (0.49)  (2.44)  (2.49) 
International conflict  0.797  0.794  0.629*  0.632*  3.284**  3.208** 
 (1.30)  (1.30)  (1.81)  (1.82)  (2.17)  (2.16) 
Observations 1560  1560  1360  1360  1373  1373 
Countries 130  130  136  136  137  137 
 
Notes: Absolute t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, 
but coefficients not reported. *, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively.  
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Table 7. Militarization and Fearon and Laitin’s measures of ethnic fractionalization adjusted for 
cultural/linguistic distance. 
 










Cultfrac (Fearon)  -1.447  -1.488  -0.906  -0.939*  -1.703  -1.731 
 (1.54)  (1.55)  (1.62)  (1.68)  (0.95)  (1.00) 
Relfrac (Fearon & 
Laitin) 
0.473 0.469 -0.620  -0.651*  0.012 0.046 
 (0.61)  (0.60)  (1.62)  (1.70)  (0.01)  (0.02) 
GNI p.c. (ln)  -0.169  -0.196  0.081  0.062  -0.432  -0.393 
 (0.67)  (0.77)  (0.70)  (0.54)  (1.10)  (1.00) 
Economic growth  1.394**  1.369**  0.097  0.066  -0.311  -0.211 
 (2.24)  (2.22)  (0.15)  (0.10)  (0.12)  (0.08) 
Polity -0.037**  -0.036**  -0.012*  -0.011*  -0.098  -0.104* 
 (2.16)  (2.08)  (1.81)  (1.70)  (1.55)  (1.65) 
Government 
expenditures 
0.160***  0.158*** 0.029** 0.029** 0.160** 0.162*** 
 (4.52)  (4.56)  (2.24)  (2.22)  (2.44)  (2.61) 
Population  (ln) -0.064  -0.086  -0.166***  -0.185**  0.323 0.338 
 (0.54)  (0.70)  (2.62)  (2.55)  (1.35)  (1.44) 
Contiguous 
militarization 
0.131** 0.122** 0.579** 0.565**  0.117  0.126* 
 (2.55)  (2.44)  (2.29)  (2.21)  (1.56)  (1.73) 
Peace years (civil 
war) 
-0.019*** -0.019***  -0.004 -0.004* -0.021  -0.020 
 (3.51)  (3.48)  (1.55)  (1.77)  (1.55)  (1.58) 
Peace years (intern. 
confl.) 
0.006 0.006  -0.011*  -0.011*  -0.035**  -0.031** 
 (0.65)  (0.68)  (1.82)  (1.79)  (2.21)  (2.12) 
Civil war  0.676***  0.675***  0.066  0.064  2.472**  2.487*** 
 (3.35)  (3.37)  (0.90)  (0.89)  (2.55)  (2.59) 
International 
conflict 
0.778 0.776  0.623*  0.630*  3.299**  3.234** 
 (1.24)  (1.25)  (1.80)  (1.81)  (2.17)  (2.16) 
Observations 1561  1561  1362  1362  1374  1374 
Countries 129  129  136  136  137  137 
 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but 
coefficients not reported. *, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively. 
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Table 8. Militarization and Montalvo and Reynal-Queirol’s measures of ethnic and religious 
polarization. 
 









0.112 0.081 0.179 0.175 -1.600  -1.581 
  (0.11) (0.08) (0.26) (0.26) (0.82) (0.81) 
Relpol (Montalvo 
& R-Q.) 
0.331 0.071 0.074 0.053 0.099 0.114 
  (0.52) (0.10) (0.21) (0.16) (0.08) (0.09) 
GNI p.c. (ln)  0.183  0.062  0.252**  0.244**  -0.095  -0.097 
  (0.76) (0.20) (2.17) (2.10) (0.26) (0.26) 
Economic growth  0.825  0.833  -0.976  -0.976  -4.506  -4.381 
  (1.19) (1.19) (0.88) (0.88) (1.15) (1.13) 
Polity -0.035*  -0.031*  -0.005  -0.005  -0.157**  -0.157** 
  (1.91) (1.74) (0.76) (0.74) (2.08) (2.11) 
Government 
expenditures 
0.134*** 0.128***  0.016**  0.016**  0.204***  0.200** 
  (4.98) (4.81) (1.99) (1.99) (2.59) (2.56) 
Population (ln)  -0.153  -0.251  -0.236***  -0.246***  0.274  0.264 
  (1.08) (1.46) (3.07) (3.06) (1.05) (1.01) 
Contiguous 
militarization 
0.103** 0.089* 0.579** 0.574**  0.120  0.116 
  (1.97) (1.77) (2.15) (2.14) (1.38) (1.34) 
Peace years (civil 
war) 
-0.023*** -0.022*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.042** -0.041** 
  (3.86) (3.82) (2.85) (2.91) (2.35) (2.40) 
Peace years 
(intern. confl.) 
0.010 0.012 -0.007  -0.007  -0.035**  -0.035** 
  (1.20) (1.38) (1.21) (1.19) (2.24) (2.28) 
Civil war  0.597***  0.602***  0.067  0.067  2.178**  2.187** 
  (2.90) (2.95) (0.90) (0.92) (2.18) (2.21) 
International 
conflict 
0.253 0.231  0.298*  0.296*  1.865**  1.887** 
  (0.86) (0.81) (1.74) (1.74) (2.10) (2.16) 
Observations  1307 1307 1161 1161 1164 1164 
Countries 102  102  109  109  109  109 
 
Notes: Absolute t-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but 
coefficients not reported. *, **, *** significant at .1, .05 and .01 level, respectively.  
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Table 9. Militarization and Cederman and Girardin’s measure of ethno-nationalist exclusion, 1988–2002 
 












Ethexclusion (Cederman & 
Girardin) 
2.310 1.180 1.275  1.121  -4.870  -4.606 
  (1.10) (0.52) (0.91)  (0.81)  (1.08) (1.01) 
GNI  p.c.  (ln)  0.139 0.275 0.208  0.221  -0.618  -0.719 
  (0.53) (0.74) (1.28)  (1.29)  (0.84) (0.97) 
Economic growth  1.983**  1.887***  0.126  0.041  -1.738  -1.754 
  (2.57) (2.59) (0.12)  (0.04)  (0.49) (0.50) 
Polity -0.001  0.012  -0.033**  -0.032**  0.035  0.053 
  (0.03) (0.53) (2.14)  (2.13)  (0.34) (0.53) 
Government  expenditures  0.177***  0.175***  0.008 0.007 0.037  0.039 
  (5.01) (5.27) (0.50)  (0.45)  (0.66) (0.70) 
Population (ln)  -0.303  -0.952**  -0.245**  -0.305***  0.123  0.086 
  (1.33) (2.17) (2.57)  (2.71)  (0.50) (0.37) 
Contiguous militarization  0.100*  0.078  0.547*  0.531*  0.397**  0.387** 
  (1.75) (1.44) (1.94)  (1.88)  (2.17) (2.07) 
Peace years (civil war)  -0.023*  -0.026* 0.000  -0.002 0.005  0.007 
  (1.81) (1.77) (0.06)  (0.42)  (0.23) (0.32) 
Peace years (intern. conflict) 0.014  0.014  -0.008  -0.009 -0.026  -0.026 
  (1.56) (1.52) (1.06)  (1.07)  (1.48) (1.49) 
Civil  war  0.149 0.128 -0.079  -0.096  0.542 0.572 
  (0.66) (0.59) (0.82)  (1.06)  (0.69) (0.74) 
International conflict  -0.027  0.013  0.336  0.346  1.684*  1.694* 
  (0.09) (0.05) (1.43)  (1.46)  (1.69) (1.74) 
Observations  876 876 671  671  678 678 
Countries  69 69 70  70  70 70 
 
Notes: Absolute t- and z-statistics in brackets. Constant and year-specific time-dummies included, but 
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